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Motivation. Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are
mostly deployed in heterogeneous environments
with resource availability varying not only across
the nodes but also over time. If any of the shared
computational, storage or network resources are
exhausted, failures and delays occur. The com-
monly used crash-stop failure model assumes that
once a node stops sending messages it never again
resumes. Such failures are trivially detected and
appropriate algorithms are run that maintain the
connectivity and routing efficiency of the P2P over-
lay under continuous arrivals and departures of the
peers (i.e. churn) [6], [4].
The failure detection mechanisms in the crash-
stop model are typically tuned to minimize the
number of false positives that might be caused by
intermittent message dropping or delays. Avoiding
these false positives is important as oversensitive
failure detection triggers more overlay maintenance
events. Overlay maintenance is costly, not only be-
cause the peers need to run the necessary protocols
for acquiring new neighbors, but also because the
applications (e.g. DHTs) using the overlay need to
respond to the failures as well. For these reasons
the handling of the non-permanent failures cannot
simply be delegated to the overlay maintenance.
These failures may significantly affect overlay rout-
ing and additional fault-tolerance mechanisms are
necessary.
The failure model. The causes of message loss
and delays can be numerous. In heterogenous P2P
systems running ever more intensive workloads
nodes may become overloaded [5]. Networks may
experience transient connectivity problems [3]. Ex-
ternal adversaries can mount DDoS attacks [2],
while the internal adversaries can take control over
a fraction of the peers in the system and disrupt the
message passing protocols [1].
In this paper we abstract away from the causes of
failures and subsume them in a well defined failure
model. A fraction of peers are allowed to arbitrarily
delay or drop messages. The drops and delays
can occur in a message-dependent way. However,
we forbid message mutation and spurious message
injection.
The protocol. Within the above failure model we
address the problem of reliable recursive message
routing in structured overlays. In our Forward
Feedback Protocol (FFP) each routed message
is followed on its routing path by a feedback
message. Feedback signals either success or failure
of message delivery. Peers accumulate feedback and
based on it adjust their routing decisions. Rout-
ing path delays exceeding a timeout and dropped
messages trigger negative feedback, which leads to
readjustment of the paths to route around the peers
causing delays or loss.
Each peer locally keeps a set of success esti-
mators for each of its neighbors. The success esti-
mators are random variables reflecting the history
of the past routing outcomes. When a message
arrives and needs to be forwarded the peer draws
samples from the success estimators. Based on
these samples the peer probabilistically picks the
next hop that maximizes routing success. When the
feedback message subsequently arrives it is used
to update the success estimators. Over time as the
peer is forwarding service requests and receiving
feedback it improves its routing decisions.
The proposed FFP protocol has the following
properties:
• path-wide fault-tolerance - FFP’s failure de-
tection covers the whole routing process: from
the moment the source sends the message,
until the final destination acknowledges the
receipt. Thanks to that FFP can respond to
failures that can only be detected at the routing
path level, such as when the delay accumulated
over the whole path exceeds the application
timeouts.
• low overhead - peers in our system contin-
uously gather the routing performance data
about their neighbors and use it for making
the routing decisions. This is in contrast to
some of the existing approaches which rely on
multiple redundant paths for increasing fault-
tolerance. Evaluation shows that despite the 2-
5 times lower bandwidth usage our solution
achieves the success rate comparable to the
existing approaches.
• zero-knowledge routing - FFP peers do
not require any prior knowledge about their
neighbors, even their location in the ID
space. Through feedback each peer individu-
ally learns which of its neighbors are reliable
forwarders for which destinations and the net-
work as a whole converges on efficient routing
paths.
• scalability - FFP is fully decentralized and
scalable, we show the local state size to be
only O(log2(N)) in terms of the network size.
• universality - FFP is general enough to be
used with any recursively routing overlay or
in general in any recursively routing network.
Evaluation. The system is implemented using
the ProtoPeer1 toolkit and evaluated in a PlanetLab
deployment.
We consider the following routing protocols: (1)
NM - no routing fault-tolerance mechanisms, (2)
MULTIk - multipath routing as in [1], in the
first hop the source chooses k neighbors closest
to the destination instead of one, (3) ITERk -
iterative routing scheme based on Kademlia[4] with
k simultaneous lookups and (4) FFP - system
running the FFP. In all setups we use a bidirectional
Chord [6] implementation. Each peer sends one
service request to a random destination ID every
500-1500ms. Each deployment is approximately
350 PlanetLab hosts in size. We are using real-
world Kademlia churn traces taken from [7]. FFP’s
resilience to the dropping attacks is comparable to
that of the existing approaches (Fig. 1) while at
the same time FFP has 2-5 times lower bandwidth
consumption (Fig. 2). FFP also detects and routes
around peers excessively delaying messages and
tolerates churn.
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Fig. 1. Resilience to message dropping. Every 5mins. a
new 10% batch of peers starts to drop all messages except
their own lookup traffic. FFP rapidly responds to the failures
and routes around the droppers and reaches performance level
of the existing approaches.
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Fig. 2. Bandwidth usage per message delivery. Setup as in
Fig. 1. Iterative and multipath routing relies on 4-way message
redundancy for fault-tolerance, which results in high bandwidth
usage. FFP’s only overhead are the feedback messages, which
are small in size and can be sent in bulk.
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